北京大学经济学院管汉晖：“中国唐朝均田制，社会流动和官僚系统改造”

 　　北京大学经济学院管汉晖副教授：北京大学经济学院讲师，主要研究方向：中国经济史国际经济学，在比较大学主要教授课程：中国经济史，经济学原理，银行微观经济学，金融市场，商业银行管理，等课程。

  　　北京大学经济学院管汉晖副教授在中国唐朝均田制，社会流动和官僚系统改造，在职研究生讲座中指出：在帝制中国，这是世界上最早的官制度，也是西方国家的公务员制度的基础上，公务员考试制度似乎在代替世袭制在唐朝(618-907)的。本次讲座试图对这一政治体制变革背后的经济驱动力。北京大学经济学院管汉晖副教授发现，均田制的实施可以解释为什么官僚体制变革发生在中国唐朝。长期实施均田制侵蚀贵族群体以及他们的垄断政治权力的经济基础;因此，社会结构变得比在贵族和世袭制度更高的水平。出于这个原因，贵族集团不得不与手段检查，从而诱发官僚体制转变，从大众选择的精英分享政治权力。利用新建的数据集从第一手传记概率回归提供了坚实的经验证据为我们的猜测，和IV估计验证的关系是因果关系。我们的发现表明，只有当经济因素彻底改变社会结构，就可能导致重大的政治制度过渡。以下为原文。   　　The Civil Service Exam System in Imperial China, which is the earliest Official Selection System in the world, and also is foundation of the Civil Servant System of western countries, appeared in replace of the Hereditary System in Tang Dynasty (618-907). This paper seeks for the economic driving force behind this political institutions transformation. We find that the implementation of Land Equalization policy could explain why bureaucracy system transformation happened in Tang China. The long-term enforcement of Land Equalization policy eroded economic base of aristocrat groups as well as their monopoly political power; therefore, social structure became more horizontal than in the aristocrat and hereditary system. For this reason, the aristocrat groups had to share political power with elites selected from the populace by means of examination, which induced bureaucracy system transformation. Probit regression using a newly-constructed dataset from first-hand biographies provided solid empirical evidence for our conjectures, and IV estimation verifies that the relationship is causal. Our finding suggests that only if economic factor changed social structure thoroughly, it could lead to momentous political institution transition.